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TPM-gestützte Integritätsnachweise für sicherheitskritisches Red-Teaming

  • David Fölk

    Student thesis: Master's Thesis

    Abstract

    Red teaming operations in critical infrastructure environments pose unique challenges
    regarding accountability and verifiability. In scenarios where technical failures or se
    curity incidents occur during an ongoing penetration test, it is crucial to ensure that
    captured actions and relevant system events are transparently documented– both to
    facilitate root cause analysis and to protect the team in case the incident was merely
    coincidental and unrelated to their activities.
    This thesis explores the use of Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) in combination with
    a hash chain, TPM policy binding, key pinning, AK attestation, a sealed pin, periodic
    TPM-signed checkpoints, and mandatory RFC 3161 timestamps to generate verifiable
    integrity proofs for offensive security operations. The mechanism combines several lay
    ers: the hash chain binds event content and order, the TPM links checkpoint payloads
    to a hardware-bound key of the logging platform, and the TSA externally anchors each
    checkpoint payload digest in time. As a result, already timestamped log prefixes cannot
    later be changed or consistently regenerated without detection. The mechanism proves
    integrity from the point where events enter the logging pipeline.
    A daemon is developed that integrates with a Linux logging pipeline during red team
    engagements. It records captured log events, cryptographically secures them via TPM
    and TSA anchoring, and stores them in a format suitable for later forensic verification.
    The resulting prototype is evaluated on a real TPM-backed test host. The evaluation
    covers build, installation, provisioning, rsyslog integration, finalization, offline verifica
    tion, and targeted manipulations of raw logs, chain data, checkpoints, TSA tokens, trust
    artifacts, and finalization metadata. The corresponding raw artifacts are included as a
    digital appendix.
    Date of Award2026
    Original languageGerman (Austria)
    Awarding Institution
    • FH OÖ
    SupervisorEckehard Hermann (Supervisor)

    Studyprogram

    • Secure Information Systems

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