The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism

Christian Wallmann, Jon Williamson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)


This paper poses a problem for Lewis’ Principal Principle in a subjective Bayesian framework: we show that, where chances inform degrees of belief, subjective Bayesianism fails to validate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. This problem points to a tension between the Principal Principle and the claim that conditional degrees of belief are conditional probabilities. However, one version of objective Bayesianism has a straightforward resolution to this problem, because it avoids this latter claim. The problem, then, offers some support to this version of objective Bayesianism.

Original languageEnglish
Article number3
JournalEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2020


  • Bayesianism
  • Objective Bayesianism
  • Pooling
  • Principal principle
  • Subjective Bayesianism


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