Applying Relay Attacks to Google Wallet

Michael Roland, Josef Langer, Josef Scharinger

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingsConference contributionpeer-review

44 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The recent emergence of Near Field Communication (NFC) enabled smart phones resulted in an increasing interest in NFC security. Several new attack scenarios, using NFC devices either as attack platform or as device under attack, have been discovered. One of them is the software-based relay attack. In this paper we evaluate the feasibility of the software-based relay attack in an existing mobile contactless payment system. We give an in-depth analysis of Google Wallet's credit card payment functionality. We describe our prototypical relay system that we used to successfully mount the software-based relay attack on Google Wallet. We discuss the practicability and threat potential of the attack and provide several possible workarounds. Finally, we analyze Google's approach to solving the issue of software-based relay attacks in their recent releases of Google Wallet.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2013 5th International Workshop on Near Field Communication, NFC 2013
PublisherIEEE Computer Society’s Conference Publishing Services
Pages1-6
ISBN (Print)9781467348379
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Event5th International Workshop on Near Field Communication (NFC 2013) - Zurich, Switzerland
Duration: 5 Feb 20135 Feb 2013
http://nfc-workshop.org/2013/

Publication series

Name2013 5th International Workshop on Near Field Communication, NFC 2013

Workshop

Workshop5th International Workshop on Near Field Communication (NFC 2013)
CountrySwitzerland
CityZurich
Period05.02.201305.02.2013
Internet address

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