Admissibility troubles for Bayesian direct inference principles.

Christian Wallmann, James Hawthorne

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)


Direct inferences identify certain probabilistic credences or confirmation-function-likelihoods with values of objective chances or relative frequencies. The best known version of a direct inference principle is David Lewis’s Principal Principle. Certain kinds of statements undermine direct inferences. Lewis calls such statements inadmissible. We show that on any Bayesian account of direct inference several kinds of intuitively innocent statements turn out to be inadmissible. This may pose a significant challenge to Bayesian accounts of direct inference. We suggest some ways in which these challenges may be addressed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)957-993
Number of pages37
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2020


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