Safety-critical cyber-physical systems (CPS) should be analyzed using formal verification techniques in order to gain insight into and obtain rigorous safety guarantees about their behavior. For practical purposes, methods are needed to split modeling and verification effort into manageable pieces and link formal artifacts and techniques with implementation. In this paper we present a tool chain that supports component-based modeling and verification of CPS, generation of monitors, and systematic (but unverified) translation of models and monitors into executable code. A running example demonstrates how to model a system in a component-based fashion in differential dynamic logic (dL), how to represent and structure these models in the syntax of the hybrid systems theorem prover KeYmaeraÂ X (which implements dL), and how to prove properties in KeYmaeraÂ X. The verified components are the source for translation into executable C code, which can be run on controlled components (e.g., a robot). Additionally, we demonstrate how to generate monitors that validate the behavior of uncontrolled components (e.g., validate the assumptions made about obstacles).