@article{0e7dd28bee544b5388fbd203a50a4461,
title = "The Principal Principle implies the Principle of Indifference",
abstract = "We argue that David Lewis's principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism.",
author = "Christian Wallmann and James Hawthorne and Jon Williamson and Juergen Landes",
note = "Funding Information: We are very grateful to Seamus Bradley, David Corfield, Luke Fenton-Glynn, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Gregory Wheeler, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. J{\"u}rgen Landes and Jon Williamson were supported by the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council, on the project 'From Objective Bayesian Epistemology to Inductive Logic'. Christian Wallmann was supported by the Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy of the Republic Austria (BMWFW) in cooperation with the Austrian Agency for International Mobility and Cooperation in Education, Science and Research (OeAD-GmbH) (Grant: Marietta Blau). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved.",
year = "2017",
month = mar,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1093/bjps/axv030",
language = "English",
volume = "68",
pages = "123--131",
journal = "British Journal for the Philosophy of Science",
issn = "0007-0882",
publisher = "University of Chicago Press",
number = "1",
}