@article{4d73b0fe52cf41ef8888da20596a5829,
title = "Collaboration expectation gaps, transparency and integrated NPD performance: A multi-case study",
abstract = "This paper explores the implications of what happens when a buying firm's desired and realized levels of collaboration differ in the context of an integrated new product development (NPD) project. Using analysis of six case studies, we observe varying levels of such collaboration expectation gaps (CEG) and conclude that these gaps can impact NPD project performance. In addition, collaboration transparency is established when a firm and its partner firm comprehend the factors (benefits, risks, costs) that motivate collaboration between them. We observe that the presence of collaboration transparency impacts the emergence of CEG across the phases of an NPD project. These findings extend existing theory on buyer-supplier relationships in NPD projects and introduce CEG and collaboration transparency as important concepts in understanding improved collaboration performance.",
keywords = "Buyer supplier relationships, Collaboration, Goal congruence, Integration, New product development, Transparency, Visibility",
author = "DeCampos, \{Hugo A.\} and Fawcett, \{Stanley E.\} and Melnyk, \{Steven A.\}",
note = "Funding Information: Despite extensive literature supporting and calling for early supplier involvement in NPD (see Suurmond et al. (2020) literature review and meta-analysis on the topic), there are a number of instances (cases B, E and F) where collaboration in the early idea conception phase was actually not desired. The reason for this was due to the specialized nature of the work needed to initiate the project, not by both firms, but by only one of the firms. The benefits of the collaboration would come in later phases. In case B, it was the supplier that initiated the NPD project and brought the developed idea to the buying firm. In cases E and F, the buying firm initiated the project and engaged a supplier in collaborative initiatives only at that stage where that supplier added value to the process. This suggests that early supplier involvement is not necessarily a {\textquoteleft}one size fits all{\textquoteright} prescription for collaborative NPD projects and that it may not always be wise to involve suppliers at higher levels of collaboration as early as possible. Rather, effective supplier involvement and collaboration may depend more on those factors that identify value creation opportunities at the right stage of the NPD project. This corroborates the findings and conclusions in Suurmond et al. (2020: 39) that “to achieve higher NPD performance, managers should consider the division of labor and tasks between firms and their suppliers and appropriately time the involvement of suppliers in their NPD projects…Earlier involvement as such is not always better …”. Our study results support this conclusion.A key challenge, however, that emerged in the development stage of the new design was agreeing to the appropriate welding process to be used. Various iterations and prototypes of competing designs were tested and through the iterative learning process, the team converged on a final solution. At this point in time MCC presented PPC with revised quotations for the new design. These quotations, however, were at price levels much higher than what was originally estimated and presented by MCC at the Kaizen event. Funding and ownership of the tooling also became an item of disagreement at this point in time. MCC ultimately agreed to pay for and own the tooling and the two firms agreed on a new multi-year contract. While this agreement reduced financial uncertainty for both firms, it also introduced new sources of contention. Change requests issued by PPC were often met with skepticism by MMC since they were bearing the brunt of the tooling financial burden and timing impacts associated with change requests. PPC engineers were focused on maximizing the technical performance of the redesigned component, while MMC engineers pushed back on those items they felt were not necessary to achieve compliance with the specifications.Despite CTI's objections, GC proceeded with development of the new system and notified CTI that GC would end production of the stand-alone gearbox supplied to CTI. CTI realized that maintaining GC as their sole gearbox supplier was no longer in the best interest of the firm. They therefore decided to introduce an alternate gearbox supplier that would not only produce gearboxes with the desired warranty terms but would also allow CTI to brand the product with their own private label, something that was new and of value to CTI. While this was being done, CTI did provide GC with the necessary product development support needed for GC to ultimately launch the Gen-2 design but then offered not only the GC product to cement truck customers, but also offered the competing CTI-branded alternative with better warranty terms and serviceability. GC, who had at one time 100\% penetration of all CTI produced cement trucks, fell to having single-digit percent penetration. This case is categorized as one with an overall lower level of project performance. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 Elsevier Ltd",
year = "2022",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1016/j.pursup.2022.100789",
language = "English",
volume = "28",
journal = "Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management",
issn = "1478-4092",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "4",
}